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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 920665-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in not giving Mr. Tinoco's 
proposed instructions relating to the meaning of attempt, requests 
which would have enabled the jury to focus on the applicable mens 
rea? "Because an appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents questions of law only, we grant no particular 
deference to the trial court's rulings.w Carpet Barn v. State, 786 
P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App. 1990); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 
(Utah 1991); accord State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992) (on 
"matter[s] of statutory interpretation[,] . . . we review the trial 
court's ruling for correctness and give no deference to its 
conclusions"). 
2. Was Mr. Tinoco improperly convicted of a crime which was 
a legal impossibility? See State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 
1992) (questions of law are reviewed for correctness); State v. 
Haston, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (1993) (per curiam). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103. (R 136). The State also had charged defendant/ 
appellant Francisco Tinoco with the greater offense, attempted 
criminal homicide. (R 7-8). The jury, though, only adjudged him 
guilty of the lesser included offense. (R 132, 134) (verdict dated 
August 20, 1992). 
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At the sentencing proceedings, held on September 21, 1992, 
(R 613), the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson ordered Mr. Tinoco to serve 
an indeterminate term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison, together with various court ordered amounts. (R 136). The 
sentence was enhanced by, and ran consecutively to, another five 
year term for the use of a firearm. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3). 
(R 622). Commitment began forthwith. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On or about April 20, 1992, Rogellio Quinones, who was a 
friend of Francisco Tinoco, visited Francisco just outside his 
home. (R 497). Accompanying Quinones was Jesus Rodriguez Estrada, 
a person not close to Francisco. (R 497). Jesus began talking 
about guns and asked Francisco to purchase some. (R 499)• 
Francisco declined, feeling uncomfortable with Jesus. (R 500-01). 
Francisco went inside his residence. 
A while later, Rogellio and Jesus entered Francisco's home 
whereupon Jesus noticed Francisco's shotgun, positioned by his 
sofa. Jesus again talked about guns that he wanted to sell. 
(R 508). Jesus also expressed an interest in Francisco's gun, 
indicating that he wanted to grab it. (R 509). 
Jesus, who had been drinking, became belligerent and angry, 
calling Francisco a "faggot". (R 509). Jesus chided Francisco for 
1 "Because the facts are unimportant to the issue before 
us [a legal question], we will summarize them briefly." State v. 
Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992). 
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having weapons when he "didn't have the guts to use them." 
(R 512). Then, in a threatening manner, Jesus stood up and lunged 
at Francisco. (R 462, 512). Francisco reacted, grabbing the gun 
and shooting Jesus in the left upper arm and chest. (R 276, 
512-15). 
By comparison, the State claimed that Francisco was on his 
sofa, "pumping11 the shotgun, putting the shells in and taking them 
out when Jesus entered the residence. (R 312). Jesus was under the 
impression that Francisco wanted to fight and spoke about different 
types of weapons. (R 310-11). 
Jesus then decided to leave and started walking towards the 
door. (R 312). Francisco apparently said something in Spanish, 
pointed the gun at Jesus (who had turned around) and fired the gun. 
(R 312). 
The State argued that Francisco Tinoco attempted to murder 
or seriously injure Jesus Rodriguez Estrada. (R 111, 114-16, 570, 
571, 578, 582). Mr. Tinoco explained that he had only acted in 
self-defense. (R 584). At issue here are the propriety of the jury 
instructions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it refused to give Mr. Tinoco's 
proposed changes to the jury instructions. The proposals would have 
better defined the applicable mental state pertinent to the elements 
of the charged offenses. Without the proposed changes, the 
instructions contradicted themselves and left the jury with 
4 
inadequate guidance as to which of the listed mens rea they were 
required to find. The improperly worded instructions also allowed 
the jury to find that Mr. Tinoco attempted a reckless act. Such a 
result is a legal impossibility. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLANTS REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury on, 
inter alia, the crimes of attempted criminal homicide, (R 96, 111), 
and the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. (R 115). 
The jury acquitted Mr. Tinoco of the greater offense. (R 111, 115). 
While the jury did convict him of the lesser offense, the 
terms incorporated therein were improperly defined. One aggravated 
assault instruction, jury instruction 22 stated, WA person commits 
Aggravated Assault if that person commits assault and 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury." (R 114) (emphasis added) 
(instruction 22) (attached as Addendum B); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103. 
Another aggravated assault instruction similarly required 
proof of an assault, but it also included the "recklessly" and 
"knowingly" mental states. (R 115) (instruction 23) (attached as 
Addendum C). Instruction 23 required the jury to find: 
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1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant 
Francisco Tinoco assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and 
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon 
or other means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury; 
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly, 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and 
without legal justification. 
(R 115) (emphasis added). 
Instruction 24 defines assault. (R 116) (attached as 
Addendum D). The instruction reads, inter alia; 
11
 Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
(R 116) (emphasis added) (Addendum D); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. 
The initial issue centers around the meaning of attempt, as 
set forth in subsection (a) of jury instruction 24. (R 116). 
Mr. Tinoco requested the court to insert the word, "intentionally", 
between the words, "to" and "do". (R 567). He explained that 
attempt "requires intentional conduct." (R 567). "[0]ne cannot be 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea 
of the completed crime is intentional conduct. State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91, 94 n.2 (Utah 1982), quoted in Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 
(emphasis added by the court). The erroneous nature of the court's 
refusal to properly instruct the jury on the meaning of attempt is 
compounded when viewed "[i]n concert with [his other exception.]" 
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Mr. Tinoco also sought to clarify the requisite mens rea 
listed in the aggravated assault instruction. (R 567) (jury 
instruction 23). Instruction 23 allowed the jury to choose between 
any one of three potentially applicable mental states: "recklessly", 
"knowingly", or "intentionally". (R 115) (Addendum C). Only the 
"intentional" mental state corresponded with the mens rea element 
for the attempt provision. 
To avoid this inconsistency and to make the mental states 
consistent, Mr. Tinoco requested that instruction 23 read, "That the 
said defendant did so recklessly, intentionally or knowingly, which 
ever is applicable." (R 567-68). The court refused to add this 
last clause. (R 568); (R 115). 
The court's denials left the jury with instructions which 
differed on the applicable mental state. The "aggravated assault" 
instruction allowed the jury to find that the act was committed 
"recklessly". (R 115) (instruction 23) (Addendum C). However, the 
subsection (a) provision of the "attempt" instruction required 
intentional conduct. (R 116) (instruction 24) (Addendum D). Since 
the necessary mens rea of "aggravated assault" could have been 
reckless conduct, (R 115), and because the jury may have selected 
the subsection (a) "attempt" alternative in concluding that an 
"assault" occurred, (R 116),2 the "aggravated assault" conviction 
2 During closing argument, the State also asked the jury 
to consider subsection (a) of the attempt provision as one of three 
possible alternative which could support its verdict: 
-[footnote continued on next page] 
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was improperly premised. See also Vigilf 842 P.2d at 846-47 
("attempt provisions require a more culpable mental state than 
recklessness for conduct that creates the substantial step11) ; 
Howell. 649 P.2d at 94 n.2 ("one cannot be guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the completed crime 
is intentional conduct"). 
The manner in which the jury was instructed improperly 
allowed them to find that Mr. Tinoco attempted a reckless crime. 
(R 115, 116, 567, 568); Point II. Such a result proved fatal to the 
case at bar. "Language that merely contradicts and does not explain 
a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve 
the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the 
2 -[footnote continued]-
instruction number twenty-three [asks you to] consider 
whether the State has proven that the defendant 
committed aggravated assault. The Judge has read you 
those elements. I will just go through a couple parts 
of them. The first thing you would have to find in 
order to find that there was an aggravated assault was 
that there was an assault. An assault may be any one 
of three different things. It can be an attempt with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to 
another. It can be a threat accompanied by a showing 
of immediate force or violence to do bodily injury to 
another, or an act committed with unlawful force or 
violence that causes bodily injury to another. 
(R 583-84) (emphasis added)• 
If any one of the alternative theories presented to a jury 
in a criminal trial is flawed, the entire verdict is invalidated. 
In State v. Hastonf 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), 
for example, the State charged defendant Haston with two valid 
theories of attempted murder and one invalid alternative 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their 
verdict." State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045-45 (Utah App. 1987) 
(citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)). 
Clearly worded jury instructions are fundamental to the 
decision making process: 
Clarity is crucial to a just criminal law system. 
Jurors are instructed to apply the language set forth 
2 -[footnote continued]-
involving the "crime" of "attempted depraved indifference murder." 
The jury convicted him of attempted second degree murder. 3jd.; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1). However, "[s]ince the jury was allowed to 
consider the depraved indifference alternative, as well as those 
states of mind described in subsections (a) and (b) of section 
76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial." 204 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4; see also State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1991) (the 
above described jury instruction with the three alternative theories 
was attached as Addendum C in Appellant Haston's opening brief, 
which was filed in this Court on May 8, 1990). As noted recently by 
our supreme court: 
In a civil case, we will affirm a general verdict so 
long as there is one legally valid theory among those 
upon which the case went to the jury and sufficient 
evidence to support a verdict on that theory. 
However, in a criminal case the rule is to the 
contrary. . . . [A] general verdict of guilty cannot 
stand if the State's case was premised on the elements 
of the crime and any one of those theories is flawed 
or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In 
such circumstances, it is impossible to determine 
whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of the 
elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory 
of the elements of the crime. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added 
and citations omitted); accord Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 
526 (1979) ("it has long been settled that when a case is submitted 
to the jury on alternative theories, the unconstitutionality of any 
of the theories requires that the conviction [or verdict] be set 
aside"); Shell v. Mississippi, 112 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1990) (per curiam) 
(Marshall, J., concurring). 
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in our penal statutes to determine criminal liability. 
Articulating the various mental states required for the 
various crimes in the Code is difficult enough without 
giving multiple meanings to the word "intent.11 
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 849; cf. State v. Andrus, 800 P.2d 107 
(Idaho App. 1990): 
When contradictory instructions are given to a jury on 
a material issue, the error is prejudicial. We have 
considerable faith in juries, but we cannot expect 
them to discern the correct implications necessary to 
reconcile contradictory instructions given by the 
court, all of which are expected to be given equal 
weight. 
Andrusf 800 P.2d at 112. The jury instructions here failed to 
adequately define the elements of aggravated assault and they also 
expressed contradictory standards for the mens rea element. His 
conviction requires reversal. See State v. Jonesf 823 P.2d 1059 
(Utah 1991) (citations omitted) ("The general rule is that an 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error"); 
cf. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 17 
(Utah 1992) (the confusion created by unclear jury instructions may 
constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial). 
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POINT II 
THE JURY IMPROPERLY CONVICTED APPELLANT OF AN 
"OFFENSE" WHICH WAS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY 
In a closely related argument, the improperly worded 
instructions allowed the jury to convict Mr. Tinoco of a "crime,f 
which was a legal impossibility. w[0]ne cannot be guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime unless the necessary mens rea of the 
completed crime is intentional conduct." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 
91, 94 n.l (Utah 1982), quoted in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 
(Utah 1992). In other words, one cannot attempt to do a crime which 
has a reckless mens rea. Since the aggravated assault instruction 
included the "reckless" mens rea and also incorporated the attempt 
subsection, (R 115, 116), the jury may have concluded that he 
attempted a reckless act. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
Such a result is a legal impossibility. See State v. Normanf 580 
P.2d 237, 239-40 (Utah 1978) ("We hold that there cannot be an 
attempt to commit manslaughter under [the reckless subsection] of 
the statute . . . " ) ; see generally Point I. 
As set forth in Norman, "attempt" and "recklessness" were 
companion provisions improperly before the jury. Even more 
compelling is the situation in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 
1992), where the Utah Supreme Court held that an individual cannot 
attempt a depraved indifference homicide. Although depraved 
indifference homicide does not require intentional conduct, it does 
require a greater awareness of risks and consequences than the 
reckless mental state. Id. at 847-48. Despite the greater 
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awareness required for the depraved indifference mens rea, the Court 
held, "the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a conscious 
objective or desire to cause the death of another. Because the 
mental state required for depraved indifference homicide falls short 
of that intent, the crime of attempted depraved indifference 
homicide does not exist in Utah." Id. at 848 (emphasis added). 
In his attempt to clarify the requisite intent for the 
jury, Mr. Tinoco reasoned, "as we [had] previously discussed, the 
case law which talks about what kind of intent is required for any 
attempted offense . . . require[s] that it be a specific intent type 
of offense." (R 567-68). The trial court's refusal to state the 
type of intent specifically pertinent to the jury's determination 
rendered the crime a logical impossibility. See Vigilf 842 P.2d 
843; cf. (R 255-62) (the trial court also was apprised previously of 
the similar argument regarding the impossible task of committing 
"attempted depraved indifference" murder); State v. Johnson, 748 
P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) ("A proper objection need not cite a 
case; it need only fairly apprise the trial judge of the essence of 
the objection"). 
Moreover, in situations like the case at bar where a person 
has been convicted of a "crime" which was a legal impossibility, the 
Utah Supreme Court has condemned such a result because "manifest 
[in]just[ice]" would result if he was unnecessarily "incarcerated 
for a crime which is not recognized in Utah." State v. Haston, 204 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). Such an issue may be 
raised at any time. Id. (on certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, 
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defendant Haston's conviction was reversed even though the "legal 
impossibility" issue was not raised in the trial court and raised 
initially only in a footnote of the opening brief filed in the Court 
of Appeals).3 
In the instant action, Mr. Tinoco's challenge goes beyond a 
footnoted argument and he expressly relies on the supreme court 
opinions in Haston, Vigil, and the corresponding cases which 
preceded them. See, e.g., Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5 (citing 
cases). Because the instructions presented to the jury improperly 
allowed them to convict Mr. Tinoco of a a "crime" which was a 
logical impossibility, it would be "manifestly unjust" for his 
conviction to remain in place.4 Haston, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 4. 
3 Also noteworthy is that the Haston brief filed in this 
Court indicated that defense counsel actually submitted a jury 
instruction which hoped to better define attempted "depraved 
indifference." See Opening brief of Appellant Haston, Point II & 
Addenda C, D, and E (Utah App. filed May 8, 1990). 
4 See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) ("notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice"); Utah R. Evid. 103(d) (plain error 
affecting the substantial rights of a party may be corrected); State 
v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App. 1987) (extraordinary and 
constitutional error may be corrected); cf. State v. Johnson, 707 
P.2d 1174, 1181 (N.M. App. 1985) ("A conviction for a non-existent 
crime should not stand simply because not raised by either of the 
parties"); Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 
(Utah App. 1991) ("the question of whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists is one of law, and the determination of whether 
to set aside a judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 
reviewed without deference to the trial court" and may be attacked 
at any time). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this y day o f March, 1993. 
*ON*LD S. FUJI* RONA NO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of im-
prisonment — Increase of sentence if firearm 
used. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may 
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
teqp of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sen-
tence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and 
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run con-
secutively and not concurrently; 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed 
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily izyury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bod-
ily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined 
in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another, or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reason-
ably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such in-
structions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits 
assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. *-«•? 
Before you can convict the defendant, Francisco Tinoco, of 
the offense of Aggravated Assault# a lesser included offense of 
Count I of the Information, you must have found that the 
evidence fails to establish one or more of the elements of 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Francisco Tinoco 
assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and 
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury; 
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly, 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and without legal 
justification. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this 
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find that the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated 
Assault, a lesser included offense of Count I of the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I. 
ADDENDUM D 
-A INSTRUCTION NO, 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an 
impairment of physical condition. 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; 
or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally 
or in any other manner that the actor is in control of 
such an item. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law 
or unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
